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I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut? Revisiting the StudentAthlete as an “Employee” Under the National Labor Relations Act
Abstract
This Article argues why the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) Big-Time Division I College
Football and Men’s Basketball student-athletes are legally “employees” and why these student-athletes
are inadequately compensated for their revenue-producing skills.
Part II of this Article sets forth the common law “right of control” test and the National Labor Relation
Act’s (NLRA) special statutory test for students in a university setting, and shows how the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) and the judiciary determine whether a particular person, specifically a university
student, meets these standards and is legally an “employee”. Moreover, the NCAA asserts it does not
have to compensate these student-athletes above their grant-in-aid because their relationship with their
universities is an educational one. Part II also discusses the right of publicity tort to show that the
relationship between these particular student-athletes and the NCAA is predominantly an economic one
and not an educational one.
Part III of this Article applies two tests, the common law “right of control” test and the NLRB’s special
statutory test it developed and applied to university students in Brown to show that these particular
“student-athletes” are legally “employees.” As such, they should be compensated more than the grant-inaid they already receive from the NCAA for their revenue-producing skills. This section also discusses
Texas A&M Quarterback Johnny Manziel, and why Texas A&M University is reaping major financial benefit
for the misappropriation of Manziel’s “likeness.” Part III also discusses NCAA Proposal 26 and how the
NCAA and its member schools are continuing to invent innovative ways to misappropriate studentathletes’ “likenesses” for financial gain without compensating them. Additionally, this section illustrates
that former student-athletes in addition to current athletes recognize that the NCAA is exploiting them for
commercial gain without compensation. This section concludes with three potential solutions to how the
NCAA could pay the student-athletes and at the same time advances the NCAA’s amateurism dogma in
college athletics. The NCAA can no longer use its affirmative defense of “amateurism,” and should
develop a payment method to compensate the services rendered by student-athletes who are the true
moneymakers for its lucrative commercial enterprise.
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Abstract
This Article argues why the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) Big-Time Division I College Football and Men’s Basketball studentathletes are legally “employees” and why these student-athletes are inadequately compensated for their
revenue-producing skills.
Part II of this Article sets forth the common
law “right of control” test and the National Labor Relation Act’s (NLRA) special statutory test for students in a university setting, and shows how the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the judiciary determine whether a particular person, specifically a university student, meets these standards
and is legally an “employee”. Moreover, the NCAA
asserts it does not have to compensate these studentathletes above their grant-in-aid because their relationship with their universities is an educational one.
Part II also discusses the right of publicity tort to
show that the relationship between these particular
student-athletes and the NCAA is predominantly an
economic one and not an educational one.
Part III of this Article applies two tests, the
common law “right of control” test and the NLRB’s
special statutory test it developed and applied to
university students in Brown to show that these particular “student-athletes” are legally “employees.” As
such, they should be compensated more than the
grant-in-aid they already receive from the NCAA for
their revenue-producing skills. This section also discusses Texas A&M Quarterback Johnny Manziel,
and why Texas A&M University is reaping major financial benefit for the misappropriation of Manziel’s
“likeness.” Part III also discusses NCAA Proposal 26
and how the NCAA and its member schools are continuing to invent innovative ways to misappropriate
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student-athletes’ “likenesses” for financial gain without compensating them. Additionally, this section illustrates that former student-athletes in addition to
current athletes recognize that the NCAA is exploiting them for commercial gain without compensation.
This section concludes with three potential solutions
to how the NCAA could pay the student-athletes and
at the same time advances the NCAA’s amateurism
dogma in college athletics. The NCAA can no longer
use its affirmative defense of “amateurism,” and
should develop a payment method to compensate the
services rendered by student-athletes who are the
true moneymakers for its lucrative commercial enterprise.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year student-athletes who compete in
revenue generating sports, such as Big-Time College
Football and Division I Men’s Basketball, produce
billions of dollars which are funneled directly to the
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National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).1
The idea of paying these particular student-athletes
is an ongoing debate. The large revenue generated
from the BCS Championship football series and
“March Madness” created a clamoring for compensating Big-Time College Football and Division I Men’s
Basketball players beyond that of an athletic scholarship, or what the NCAA calls a grant-in-aid.2
While operating in a purely capitalistic and professional atmosphere, the NCAA continues to endorse
its amateurism concept in college athletics. These
particular student-athletes realize that the NCAA
commercialized the industry and generates billions of
dollars in revenue from doing so. Even though the
NCAA asserts the value of amateurism in college
athletics, the student-athletes are now attempting to
get a bigger piece of the pie.3
The NCAA initially created the term “studentathlete” to stop workers’ compensation lawsuits
against it in the 1950s and 1960s,4 and to obscure the
1 Nicholas Fram & Thomas Frampton, College Athletes
Deserve Employee Status, SF GATE, (March 25, 2012, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/College-athletes-deserveemployee-status-3430855.php.
2 Athletic Financial Aid Rules Mandated by the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), WASH. STATE UNIV.,
http://finaid.wsu.edu/media/675179/Athletic-Financial-AidRules-finaid-website.pdf (explaining athletic grant-in-aid
“consists of tuition, books, fees and room & board,” however,
“note that transportation and miscellaneous are not included”).
3 Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint:
Paying College Athletes, SPORT J. (June 15, 2012, 9:48 AM),
http://thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-payingcollege-athletes.
4 Jared Wade, How the NCAA Has Used the Term “StudentAthlete” to Avoid Paying Workers Comp Liabilities, NAT’L L.
REV. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/how-
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reality of the university-student-athlete employmentrelationship.5 Part I of this Article sets forth the
common law “right of control” test6 and the National
Labor Relation Act’s (NLRA) special statutory test
for students in a university setting,7 and shows how
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the
judiciary determine whether a particular person,
specifically a university student, meets these standards and is legally an “employee.” Moreover, the
NCAA asserts it does not have to compensate these
student-athletes above their grant-in-aid because
their relationship with their universities is an educational one. This part also discusses the right of pub-

ncaa-has-used-term-student-athlete-to-avoid-paying-workerscomp-liabilities.
5 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The
Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete As Employee,
81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 86 (2006).
6 St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 478 (2005)
(“‘[w]hile we recognize that the common-law agency test
described by the Restatement ultimately assesses the amount
or degree of control exercised by an employing entity over an
individual, we find insufficient basis for the proposition that
those factors which do not include the concept of ‘control’ are
insignificant when compared to those that do. Section 220(2) of
the Restatement refers to 10 pertinent factors as ‘among
others,’ thereby specifically permitting the consideration of
other relevant factors as well, depending on the factual
circumstances presented . . . . Thus, the common-law agency
test encompasses a careful examination of all factors and not
just those that involve a right of control . . . . To summarize, in
determining the distinction between an employee and an
independent contractor under Section 2(3) of the Act, we shall
apply the common-law agency test and consider all the
incidents of the individual’s relationship to the employing
entity.’” (quoting Roadway Package System, 326 N.L.R.B. 842,
850 (1998))).
7 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 489 (2004).
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licity tort8 to show that the relationship between
these particular student-athletes and the NCAA is
predominantly an economic one and not an educational one.
Part II of this Article applies the common
“right of control” test and the NLRB’s special statutory test, developed in Brown,9 to student-athletes.
Both tests show that these particular studentathletes are legally employees and should be compensated by more than the grant-in-aid they already
receive from the NCAA for their revenue producing
skills. Also, this part will discuss Texas A&M Quarterback Johnny Manziel, and why Texas A&M University is reaping major financial benefit through the
misappropriation of Manziel’s likeness.
Part II will also discuss NCAA Proposal 26
and how the NCAA and its member schools are continuing to invent innovative ways to misappropriate
their student-athletes for financial gain, without
compensation. Part II further shows that former
student-athletes, in addition to current athletes recognize the NCAA is exploiting them for commercial

8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977) (“The
common form of invasion of privacy under the rule here stated
is the appropriation and use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness
to advertise the defendant’s business or product, or for some
similar commercial purpose. Apart from statute, however, the
rule stated is not limited to commercial appropriation. It
applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff’s
name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though
the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit
sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one. Statutes in some
states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of
the name or likeness.”).
9 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487.
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gain without compensation.10 Finally, this part offers three solutions as to how the NCAA could compensate student-athletes, while simultaneously advancing the NCAA’s “amateurism” dogma in college
athletics.
This Article concludes that the NCAA can no
longer use its affirmative defense of “amateurism.”
Instead, the NCAA should develop a payment method to compensate the services rendered by studentathletes, who are the true moneymakers for its lucrative commercial enterprise.
I. BACKGROUND
The NCAA is a voluntary association of approximately 1,200 colleges and universities. The
NCAA’s philosophy as it relates to the studentathlete is to promote amateurism.11In the NCAA Division I Manual, the first stated purpose is “[t]o initiate . . . and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes and to promote . . . athletics participation as a recreational pursuit.”12 Despite
the prominence of this assertion, the NCAA has
failed to further this purpose for athletes in the most
commercially lucrative sports, Big-Time College
Football (i.e., Division I Football) and Division I
Men’s Basketball.13
10 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. C 09-1967
CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 09-4882 CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 8, 2010).
11 Matthew Stross, The NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule: Blurring
Amateurism, 2 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 167 (2012); see also NCAA
DIV. I MANUAL Bylaw art. 12.01.3 (2013), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf.
12 See NCAA DIV. I MANUAL Const. art. 1.2(a) (2013).
13 Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century:
Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist? 86 OR. L. REV.
329 (2007).
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The NCAA Division I football season culminates with the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) National Championship game. The NCAA Division I
Men’s basketball season culminates with “March
Madness” and the Final Four, with the national
champion being crowned.14 Both events are big
business.
The University of Alabama played in the BCS
National Championship Game in 2012, resulting in a
total payout of $18.3 million dollars.15 Alabama received $2 million from the NCAA for directly participating.16 The remaining $16.3 million was divided
into 13 shares equally distributed into shares of approximately $1.26 million among the 12 member
Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) schools and the
SEC office.17 In addition to compensation for simply
participating, Alabama received a hefty payout for
winning the BCS National Championship in 2013. 18
Similarly, the University of Kentucky received
a large payout for winning the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship in 2012. In its most recent contract agreement with the television network CBS,
the NCAA $10.8 billion for the March Madness
broadcasting rights for the next fourteen years. 19
The direct value of the NCAA Division I Men’s BasFram & Frampton, supra note 1.
Jon Solomon, Profit from BCS National Championship
Game Won’t Be a Big Windfall, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Jan. 5,
2010, 9:01 PM), http://blog.al.com/birmingham-newsstories/2010/01/profit_from_bcs_national_champ.html.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Chris Smith, The Money Behind The BCS National
Championship, SPORTSMONEY (Jan. 7, 2013, 4:09 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/01/07/the-moneybehind-the-bcs-national-championship/.
19 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
14
15
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ketball Tournament comes from the NCAA’s Revenue Distribution plan, which explains that payouts
are “to be distributed to the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship over a six-year rolling period.”20
“That six-year payment period means that games
played in the 2012 March Madness tournament will
not count towards annual conference payouts until
2017.”21
To better understand the NCAA’s revenue distribution model for March Madness, consider the
revenue generated by the Kentucky Wildcats in
2012. Kentucky played in six tournament games in
2012, five of which are included in the NCAA’s count
of games played, as championship games are not included.22 The NCAA revenue distribution model calculates each game as a “game unit,” and each “game
unit” for the 2012 tournament was $278,820. 23 Kentucky generated approximately $1.4 million for the
South Eastern Conference as a whole due to their
tournament success in 2012.24
A. The Common Law Test and a Statutory Test
to Establish the “Employee” Status of
College Students
“Division I athletic grant-in-aid students in
college football and men’s basketball can be considered ‘employees’ under both the National Labor Rela-

20 Chris Smith, March Madness: A Trip to The Final Four is
Worth $9.5 Million, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2012, 9:45AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/03/14/marchmadness-a-trip-to-the-final-four-is-worth-9-5-million/.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.

82

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut?

tions Act and under most applicable state laws.” 25 If
a person is deemed an employee under the NLRA,
those employees are granted the rights to gather
amongst themselves and discuss their wages and
working conditions even if they are not part of a union.26 However, the NLRA only applies to employees
who work in most private sectors and specifically excludes protection to persons employed by Federal,
state, or local government.27 The question of whether a particular person is an employee has been essential in the development of American labor law. 28 The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the judiciary have developed different legal standards in
determining a person’s employee status. Thus, there
are several approaches the NLRB or the judiciary
can take in determining whether these particular
student-athletes in Division I college football and
basketball are legally employees. 29
1. The “Employee” Under the
National Labor Relations Act
The federal rights granted to employees, and
only to employees, under the NLRA are “the rights to
self-organization; to form, join, or assist labor organizations; to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; and to engage in other
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 86.
Employee Rights, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employee-rights (last
visited Jan. 17, 2014).
27 See id.
28 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 87; see also
ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 37-38
(2d ed. 2004) (describing courts’ early efforts to distinguish
between employees under the Act and other persons).
29 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 88.
25
26
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concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”30 Since
these collective bargaining rights are granted exclusively to employees under the statute, determining
whether a particular person is or is not an employee
is of paramount importance.31
The central issue with the NLRA when first
administered was that it defined both “employer” 32
and “employee”33 by reference only to each other, and
it used those definitions to distinguish the status of a
particular person in the same way. Because the
statutory language by itself fails to demarcate the
pronounced characteristics of either “employer” or
“employee” from other classes of entities or persons,
the judiciary and the NLRB have been guided mainly
by common law doctrines when determining the
meaning of the term “employee.”34 Relying solely on
common law principles, the NLRB interpreted the
NLRA’s definition of “employee” and developed the
“right of control” test.35 Under this legal standard,
the important factor in distinguishing an employee
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 89.
32 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ includes
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly. . . .”).
33 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ shall
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer, . . . but shall not include any
individual . . . having the status of an independent contractor,
or any individual employed as a supervisor . . .”).
34 E.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 89;
Klement Timber Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 681, 683 (1944).
35 Field Packing Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 850, 852-53 (1943) (holding
that truck drivers were employees and, therefore, not
independent contractors because the employer had not fully
divested itself of the right to control drivers’ work); GORMAN &
FINKIN, supra note 28, at 38.
30
31
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from an independent contractor was the level of control the alleged employer maintained over the working life of the employee. 36 The Court first applied the
‘right of control test’ in NLRB v. United States Insurance Co. of America.37 The Court in its decision noted that the term “employee” excludes “any individual
having the status of an independent contractor.” 38
The Court went on and held general agency principles will be applied in a case-by-case basis in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.”39
Congress further endorsed the common law
“right of control” test as the proper interpretation of
the statute through the addition of the 1947 TaftHartley Amendments to the NLRA.40 The Amendments expressly excluded independent contractors
from the definition of employee. The common law, as
well as the NLRB and the judiciary, have long used
the term “independent contractor” to distinguish cer36See Nat’l Freight, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 144, 145-46 (1964).
The right of control test was derived from the common law
doctrine of respondeat superior, which determines whether a
master might be liable for the torts of his servant. Under this
measure, a person who performs a particular task by his own
methods, not subject to the control of the alleged employer, is
an independent contractor, while a person who is subject to the
control of the employer, not only as to the ends to be
accomplished, but also as to the methods and means of
performing the work, is an employee. See Carnation Co., 172
N.L.R.B. 1882, 1888 (1968); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 28,
at 38.
37 NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254
(1968).
38 Id. at 256.
39 See id.
40 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not
include any individual . . . having the status of an independent
contractor.”).
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tain workers from employees, applying the right of
control standard to draw that distinction, referring to
the right of control standard as the basic measure for
determining whether individuals are employees under the NLRA.”41
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly upheld
the NLRB’s interpretation of employee and its reliance on the “right of control” standard. The Court
most recently upheld the NLRB’s interpretation of an
employee in National Labor Relations Board v. Town
& Country Electric, Inc.42 In this case Town & County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill
several positions for a construction job in Minnesota.43 Town & Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired
soon thereafter.44 These individuals applied with the
intention to organize Town & Country and were to
remain on union payroll during their time of employment.45 The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town
41 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 157; see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir.
1948) (stating that “the employer-employee relationship exists
when the person for whom the work is done has the right to
control and direct the work, not only as to the result
accomplished by the work, but also as to the details and means
by which that result is accomplished”); Teamsters Nat’l Auto.
Transp. Indus. Negotiating Comm., 335 N.L.R.B. 830, 832
(2001) (“[T]he contracting employer must have the power to give
the employees the work in question--the so-called ‘right of
control’ test.”) (footnote omitted).
42 NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
43 Id. at 87.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 88.
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& Country had refused to interview or retain the
workers because of their union affiliation, a violation
of the National Labor Relations Act.46 The Board
held that the 11 individuals met the definition of
employees under the Act and rejected Town & Country’s claims that the individuals had been refused for
other reasons.47
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term “employee”
does not include those individuals who remain on union payroll during their time of employment with another company.48 The central question that the U.S.
Supreme Court dealt with on certiorari was: Does a
worker qualify as an “employee” under the NLRA if,
while working, he is simultaneously paid by a union
to help the union organize a company? 49
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled for the Board and held that individuals
can meet the definition of employee even if they are
paid by a union to organize a non-union company
while on company payroll.50 The Court found this
result consistent with the language and purpose of
the Act as well as the dictionary definition of employee.51 The Court also reasoned that the language
of the Act seemed to specifically take into account the
possibility of workers who are paid by union organiz-

Id. at 87.
Id. at 87-88; see also Town & Country Elec., Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 106 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1997).
48 Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 629 (8th
Cir. 1994).
49 NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 87
(1995).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 90.
46
47
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ers.52
Since the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v.
Town & Country, the NLRB has further relied on
that decision in defining employee, as “[u]nder the
common law . . . a person who performs services for
another under a contract of hire, subject to the other’s control or right of control, and in return for payment.”53
2. The NLRB’s Statutory Test from Brown for
Students Seeking Status as Employees
University students who receive academic
scholarships and perform services as teaching or research assistants appear to satisfy the common law
test for “employee.” The NLRB recognized the low
threshold the common law test presents to distinct
classes of persons attempting to be regarded as “employees” under the NLRA.54
The NLRB in Brown developed a new requirement. In order for university students to be
treated as employees and granted collective bargaining rights under the NLRA, they must satisfy both
the common law “right of control” test and the
NLRB’s additional special statutory test developed in
Brown.55 In that case, Brown University filed a petiId. at 93.
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 n.27 (2004) (citing
Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 94); see also Boston
Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999) (quoting Town &
Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 91-93).
54 See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 491.
55 See id. at 487 (stating that “attempting to force the studentuniversity relationship into the traditional employer-employee
framework” is problematic and that “principles developed for
use in the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the
academic world”’) (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S.
672, 680-81 (1980)).
52
53
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tion with the NLRB, asking the Board to reconsider
and overturn the Board’s decision in NLRB v. New
York University.56 New York University dealt with
graduate student assistants who were admitted into
but not hired by the university. The central question
was whether the graduate student assistants’ supervision of teaching and research was an integral component of their academic development. The NLRB in
Brown held that the “financial support” the graduate
student assistants received in order to attend Brown
University made the relationship between the graduate student assistants and the university primarily
an educational one rather than an economic one.57
The NLRB’s decision in Brown is currently the
legal standard for determining whether a university
student is a statutory employee. In that decision the
NLRB majority acknowledged that the right to control standard must be satisfied as a general requirement.58 The NLRB further held that another specific
requirement for students was that unless the relationship between the school and the student was
“primarily economic,” rather than “primarily educational,” then the students were not employees. 59
Therefore, when students’ efforts are predominantly
See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 483.
See id. at 486.
58 See id. at 490 (“Even assuming arguendo that this is so [i.e.,
that graduate student employees are employees at the common
law], it does not follow that they are employees within the
meaning of the Act. The issue of employee status under the Act
turns on whether Congress intended to cover the individual in
question. The issue is not to be decided purely on the basis of
older common-law concepts.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Board has certainly applied the common law “right of control”
test since its 2004 Brown decision in determining whether
workers were employees under the NLRA.
59 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487-89.
56
57
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educational and not economic, then those individuals
are not employees within the meaning of the
NLRA.60 From that test it logically follows that
when a student who works for a university performs
services that are not primarily educational or academic and the relationship to the university with respect to those services is an economic one, the student may be an employee under the NLRA, provided
that he also meets the common law test for that
term.
B. Tort: Right of Publicity
To assert a claim for the tort of right of publicity, a person must demonstrate that one or more of
his or her protected attributes that are reasonably
deemed private were appropriated by another party
for that party’s own use or benefit without his or her
consent.61 The Restatement (Second) of Torts specifically notes that a person who appropriates the name
or likeness of another for his or her own use or benefit is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
privacy.62 The “own use” or “benefit” of another person’s protected attributes has been interpreted in
some states to mean a commercial benefit. 63 Other
states however, have applied it to instances where a
person uses another’s name or likeness for his or her
own purposes and benefit even though the use is not
a commercial or pecuniary benefit.64
Id.
Id.
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977)
(“Appropriation of Name or Likeness: One who appropriates to
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”).
63 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977).
60
61
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C. The NCAA National Letter of Intent
The National Letter of Intent, signed by the
potential student-athlete, is a binding contract between the individual and the university that the student-athlete attends.65 If the individual is under the
age of 21, a parent or registered guardian must cosign the agreement.66 A coach or representative of
the coaching staff cannot be present when the individual is signing.67 Once the Letter of Intent is
signed no other school can recruit that person. The
agreement is for a period of one year.68 Usually the
individual receives a scholarship towards tuition and
a stipend for room and board.69 If for any reason the
student does not meet the academic or chosen sport
performance expectations the school has the right to
terminate the agreement. 70 After one year the student-athlete’s scholarship or stipend is continued if
he or she has met academic and sport performance
expectations.71 The sequence carries forward for a
four-year matriculation at the chosen school.72
1. Student-Athlete Statement – Division I
Form 08-3a Section IV
Before the student-athlete is allowed to participate in practice, he or she must sign various sections
of Form 08-3a, the Student-Athlete Statement. Sec65 Barile v. Univ. of Virginia, 441 N.E.2d 608, 615 (Ohio
1981).
66 Signing a Letter of Intent, VARSITYEDGE.COM,
http://www.varsityedge.com/nei/varsity.nsf/main/national+lette
r+of+intent.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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tion IV of the statement contains wording which allows a student-athlete’s name or picture to promote
the NCAA and the school he or she is attending. The
exact wording is as follows:
You authorize the NCAA (or third party
acting on behalf of the NCAA, e.g., host institution, conference, local organizing committee) to use your name or picture to generally promote NCAA championships or
other NCAA events, activities or programs.73

If student-athletes do not sign the StudentAthlete Form, they are deemed ineligible for practice
and competition until the form is signed and completed. This is the same form that the NCAA references in their claim that they have the right to license the likeness and image of former studentathletes.74 The legal question then becomes: does the
form govern former student-athletes, enabling the
NCAA and its member schools to use former studentathletes’ likeness for its own commercial and promotional purposes?75
D. NCAA Proposal 26-2010
A controversial proposal by the NCAA would
broaden the way companies are allowed to use college athletes in advertising campaigns, giving athletic departments more opportunities to trade on play-

73 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C
09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
74 Id. at *4.
75 Id. at *5.
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ers’ popularity.76
Athletics officials who support the proposal
say that they are not seeking to exploit athletes, and
that the changes would align outdated NCAA rules
with today’s technologies.77 Some players also supported the amendment. 78
Contrarily, opponents of the proposal say that
the changes are overreaching. It allows sponsors to
expand their reach without compensating players for
the use of their likeness in commercial promotions. 79
While players would continue to earn nothing for the
use of their likenesses, their colleges, conferences, or
the NCAA would reap profits from the advertisers.80
Up until the time of the proposal, corporate
sponsorship companies were allowed to include pictures or images of college athletes in their advertisements as long as the athletes did not promote
commercial ventures. In addition, companies were
permitted to show only their corporate logos and
names, not their products.81
Under the proposal, corporate sponsorship
companies would now be allowed to advertise their
products and services in association with pictures or
images of college athletes, as long as the players did
not specifically endorse the products.82 The person76 Lauren Smith, Controversial NCAA Proposal Would Allow
Colleges to Cash In on Players’ Images, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Oct. 5, 2007), http://chronicle.com/article/NCAA-ProposalWould-Let/2881.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Cabinet Sponsors Possible Amendments to Likeness
Proposal, NCAA (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2011/march/cabinet
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nel who have the authority to make the proposal, a
powerful NCAA committee made up of athletics officials and faculty members, said that it provides colleges, conferences, and the NCAA greater flexibility
in developing relationships with commercial entities
that benefit the athletics program.” 83 Ellen J. Staurowsky, a professor and chair of the graduate program in the Department of Sport Management and
Media at Ithaca College said, “There is a little bit of
disingenuousness in this. Until the players are compensated, these kinds of things are problematic.”84
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applying the NLRA Common Law Test and
the Federal Labor Standards Act
1. The Right of Control Test
Under the common law tests in determining if
a particular person is an employee, the case for college student-athletes employee status is strong.
“Their labor and talent generate huge revenues for
universities, just like the services rendered by professional athletes for their leagues.”).85 These particular student-athletes are employees from the
standpoint of the common law “right of control” test:
school officials directly control their labor and exercise a level of oversight over players’ lives far greater
than that of most employees in the United States. 86
%2Bsponsors%2Bpossible%2Bamendments%2Bto%2Blikeness
%2Bproposaldf30.html; Smith, supra note 76.
82 Id.
83 Smith, supra note 76.
84 Id.
85 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
86 Id.
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Critics argue that paying college athletes is
only providing them with additional compensation on
top of the already valuable compensation they get
from universities in the form of scholarships.87 One
key principle from Brown was that the NRLB asserted that graduate student assistants, whether in an
instruction or research role, were primarily there for
educational purposes and the scholarships they received to perform their duties were requisite to obtaining their higher education degrees.88 No one
would argue that playing college football or men’s
basketball is a prerequisite to obtaining an undergraduate or graduate degree. 89
Federal law, which dictates the requirement of
a university student to meet the standard “right of
control” test and the Brown statutory test to be considered an employee, only applies to students in private institutions.90 University student-athletes competing at private institutions will probably be able to
satisfy both tests, but college athletes playing for
public institutions will be subject to state labor law,
which has generally been more favorable to studentemployees.91 Over the last ten years, undergraduate
student-employees have successfully formed unions
consisting of dining hall workers, clerical assistants,
and dormitory advisors.92
Like such studentemployees, student-athletes also render services to
their universities by filling stadiums and arenas and
87 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 157; see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir.
1948).
88 Id.
89 Fram & Frampton supra note 1.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.

95

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut?

generating revenue. State labor law has already
held that students who are employed as dining hall
workers, clerical assistants, and dormitory advisors
meet the legal standard for an employee.93 If a university student meets the legal standard of an employee by being employed as a food server in dining
halls, answering telephone calls as a telemarketing
fund raiser, or as a student advisor, then it logically
follows that the student whose scholarship requires
that he compete in college football or basketball
meets the same standard and should be recognized
as an employee.94 This question has been debated at
length, but to this point there has been no definitive
answer.
2. The Economic Reality Test
In determining an employee under the Federal
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) the U.S Supreme Court
applied the “economic reality” test in United States v.
Silk.95 The five-factor “economic reality” test would
be useful in determining whether or not studentathletes are actually employees. The factors are as
follows:
(1) the degree of control exercised by the
alleged employer;
(2) the extent of the relative investments of
the [alleged] employee and employer;
(3) the degree to which the “employee’s”
opportunity for profit and loss is
determined by the “employer”;
(4) the skill and initiative required in
performing the job; and
Id.
Id.
95 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947).
93
94
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(5) the permanency of the relationship.96

To examine if student-athletes are employees
under the “economic reality” test, I interviewed a
current University of Connecticut (“UCONN”) Division I Varsity Football player, who had just completed his third season as a linebacker for the UCONN
football team.97 Like all other Division I College
Football players, his Monday through Saturday inseason and off-season schedules are structured by his
football coaches and are strictly regimented. 98 The
football player explained that the athletic department tailors his academic class schedule around his
mandatory practice sessions.99 He explained that the
football coaches require the players to eat every meal
throughout the day together as a team, including a
midmorning and an afternoon snack together. The
linebacker coach uses this lunchtime as a film viewing session to review game UCONN campus dining
hall.100 Following breakfast, the football player attends his first class from 11:00 to 11:50 a.m. He
stated that the athletic program requires him “to
make sure that he gets classes that don’t cut into
practice time or conflict with any of the UCONN
football team’s workouts.”101
The football player attends his second class
from 1:00 to 2:15 p.m. In between the first and sec96 Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.
1987) (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 715).
97 Interview with a Univ. of Conn. Div. I Varsity Football
player (Jan. 29, 2013). Interviewee requested to remain
anonymous.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
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ond class, he reports to the dining hall for a team
lunch exclusively for linebackers.102 The linebacker
plays and strategies.103 The football player said,
“Coach Wholley will usually make us watch a video
of our last opponent and tells us what we will be doing, and what he wants to see out of us in our afternoon practice.”104 From 3:00 to 5:30 p.m., the football
player participates in an on-the-field practice that
consists of football drills and conditioning.105 Following the afternoon practice, he reports for the team
dinner and then attends an evening class.106 Additional requirements include that he must room with
other members of the team, sit in the front row of the
classroom for each of his classes, comply with a bedtime curfew six nights of the week, and the night before each game he must sleep in the campus hotel
with the other players.107
Applying the UCONN football player’s situation to the first factor of the “economics reality” test,
it shows that there is a high degree of control that
the football player’s coaches whom are hired by the
University of Connecticut have over him.
The second factor deals with the extent of the
relative investments between the student-athletes
and their respective schools. Division I college football programs, barring any NCAA penalties or sanctions against them, are allowed 85 scholarships per
year to be given out to student-athletes. The scholarships granted to those 85 individuals are good for
one year, and the amount of scholarship granted to
Id.
Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
102
103
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each student-athlete is contingent upon their athletic
and academic performance at the university.108 A
grant-in-aid is a transfer of money from the federal
government to a state or local government or individual person for the purposes of funding a project or
program.109 Grant money is not a loan, and does not
have to be repaid, but it does have to be spent according to the federal government’s guidelines for that
particular grant.110
Applying this to the football player’s situation,
the federal government gives a fund to the University of Connecticut (an academic institution funded by
the state government) for the specific purpose of furthering the UCONN football program. 111 The student-athlete, in this case, the football player, gets the
grant-in-aid for one year with the expectation that
his athletic performance will help the football team.
If enrolled at an NCAA member school and to remain
eligible to compete in NCAA intercollegiate competition, the student-athlete must adhere to academic
performance standards, set forth by the school itself,
the NCAA athletic conference the school is member

108 Lynn O’Shaugnessy, 7 Things You Need to Know About
Sports. The College Solution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jun.
22, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/the-collegesolution/2010/06/22/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-sportsscholarships.
109 Grant-In-Aid Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/grant-in-aid.asp (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014).
110 See id.
111 Steve Berkowitz, Jodi Upton & Erik Brady, Most NCAA
Division I Athletic Departments Take Subsidies, USA TODAY
(Jul. 1, 2013, 12:48 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/ncaafinances-subsidies/2142443/.
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of, and the NCAA’s rules.112 A general rule for student-athletes to remain eligible is they must be accepted for enrollment in compliance with the school’s
rules, eligible to practice under the conference and
NCAA rules, and be registered for at least 12 credit
hours for each academic term.113
The NCAA allows a student-athlete to remain
eligible for five years of athletic competition within
five calendar years of the athlete’s full-time enrollment.114 Student-athletes must earn at least six
credit hours each term to be eligible for the following
term, in addition to meeting minimum GPA requirements for graduation.115 For example, at
UCONN, the football player must maintain a GPA of
at least 1.8, and if he falls below the criteria he
would be placed on academic probation.116
To summarize, the football player must meet
the requirements of academic standing as well as the
rigorous time commitment for his chosen sport. This
includes on field practice and team meetings, mandatory team wide strength and conditioning sessions,
and the actual games. In return for assurance of the
football player’s effort for optimum performance on
the field and in the classroom, the school gave him
grant-in-aid of $26,562 for the year. In addition, for
each academic term the football player received an
112 UNIV. OF CONN. 2013-2014 STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK
6-7, available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/conn/genrel/
auto_pdf/2013-14/misc_non_event/SAHandbook.pdf.
113 See id. at 7.
114 See id. at 14, 16.
115 Remaining Eligible: Academics, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/remaining-eligible-academics (last visited
Jan. 18, 2014).
116 UNIV. OF CONN. 2013-2014 STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK,
supra note 112, at 34.
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additional $1,650 to cover the cost of student fees,
housing, on/off campus meal plans, books, supplies
and transportation. This illustrates that the “relative
investments” between the student-athlete and the
school, the alleged employee and employer, have
been met. The football player as the employee gives
up much of his time and is controlled, scheduled, and
enforced by his coaches (employees of the University
of Connecticut) and in return, he receives a one-year
stipend.
The relationship between the football player
and UCONN could also be considered an “employee
at-will” relationship, due to the fact that if he fails to
meet the academic eligibility requirements, or does
not comply with the rules in the “Division I StudentAthlete Statement,” UCONN can, after his first full
academic year as a Division I student-athlete, deny
him grant-in-aid for the upcoming year.
The third factor of the “economic reality” test,
that the employee’s opportunity for profit and loss is
determined by the employer, 117 is easily met. The
football player is required to attend every practice
and strength and conditioning workout set up by the
coaching staff. The football player says that due to
the time commitment, although not expressively
stated in the Division I Student-Athlete Statement,
it is impossible for him to hold a part-time job.118 His
daytime hours are filled with academics and his
commitment to the team activities.119 It would be
reasonable to argue that his participation in
UCONN’s football program is a job in itself (through
117 Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.
1987) (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 715).
118 Interview with a Univ. of Conn. Div. I Varsity Football
player (Jan. 29, 2013).
119 Id.
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daily preparation leading to performance at football
games) and the school compensates him for this.
As to the fourth factor,120 the skill required to
handle the football player’s job is limited to a certain
few gifted athletes. For any Division I College Football player in the Football Bowl Subdivision, it is a
rare combination of size, speed, and strength that
enable an individual to successfully compete at that
level. This football player, who received high school
and college All-American honors for his football
skills, must continue to train daily to maintain his
optimum athletic ability.
Finally, the fifth factor, “the permanency of
the relationship,”121 could be reasonably argued to be
an “employee at will” agreement. UCONN, at any
time, can deny the football player an additional year
of grant-in-aid. Before deciding to commit to playing
football at UCONN, the football player had to sign
the “NCAA National Letter of Intent” and the “Division I Student-Athlete Statement” that details all of
the NCAA guidelines, including his full commitment
to the UCONN football program.
If for any reason the football player fails to
comply with the terms set forth in both forms, the
school could deny him a second grant-in-aid year.
Also, it is at the school and the coaches’ discretion
whether the football player is “deserving” of an additional grant-in-aid year. The football player said that
the school can deny him an additional grant-in-aid
year if, “The coaches don’t think I am cutting it.” 122
In other words, whether or not the football player re120 Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 1042 (citing United States v.
Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 715).
121 Id.
122 Interview with a Univ. of Conn. Div. I Varsity Football
player (Jan. 29, 2013).
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ceives an additional grant-in-aid is in the hands of
the coaches and how they view his performance on
the football field.
B. Applying the Brown Statutory Test
The NLRB in Brown examined four criteria to
decide whether graduate assistants were employees
in line with the NLRA. The four criteria were: (1)
“the status of graduate assistants as students,” (2)
“the role of graduate student assistantships in graduate education,” (3) “the graduate student assistants’
relationship with the faculty,” and (4) “the financial
support they receive to attend Brown.”123
The first three criteria from the Brown Board
as it relates to student-athletes as employees are easily met. It is merely impossible to argue against the
first criterion because student-athletes, like graduate
assistants, routinely attend class to receive an academic degree. The second factor goes to the role of
the graduate student assistantships predominately
for educational purposes and as a prerequisite to an
educational degree.124 Playing Big-Time College
Football or Division I Men’s Basketball is certainly
not a prerequisite to obtaining a higher education
degree. The third factor has been analyzed and it
has been shown that coaches of Division I athletic
teams’ exercise a great degree of regulation over
their student-athletes.
1. Interpreting the Fourth Factor in Brown
The logic underlying the fourth factor of the
Brown analysis is flawed. Even if the fourth factor
was logical, Big-Time College Football and Men’s
123
124

Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
Id. at 483.

103

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut?

Basketball student-athletes would still be NLRA employees.125 The Brown Board relied upon a fourth
element concluding that the graduate assistants
were primarily students and not employees. 126 The
financial rewards graduate assistants received were
not compensation for teaching and research services
performed, but were merely financial aid to permit
attendance at Brown University.127 In support of its
conclusion, the NLRB underscored two aspects of
graduate assistants’ financial packages. First, the
amount provided to teaching assistants (TAs) and
resident assistants (RAs) was the same as that provided to graduate fellows for whom no teaching or
research activity was required.128 Second, the fact
that the financial aid awarded to graduate assistants
was unrelated to the quality or value of services they
rendered, indicated that the payment was not compensation for their services, but was financial assistance to attend school.129
The Brown Board improperly analyzed the
fourth factor of its own analysis. The proper analysis
in determining whether a payment is compensation
for services rendered, as opposed to financial aid, is
whether the payment to the particular person would
cease if the services were stopped.130 It is inconceivSee generally McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5.
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 The NCAA requires schools to refer to the agreement
between the university and the athlete as a “grant-in-aid” or
scholarship, rather than as an employment contract providing
pay or other compensation. Article 12.1.1 of the Division I
Manual makes it clear that an athlete is not permitted to
receive “pay” for athletic services: “An individual loses amateur
status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
125
126
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able to believe that if TAs and RAs were to withhold
their services either collectively or individually, they
would continue to receive full scholarships and stipends. It follows logically that the financial aid given to such personnel must be compensation for their
services to the university.
Even if this proper analysis of the Brown
fourth factor was looked at in regards to studentathletes, athletic grants-in-aid are never given without the requirement of athletic services being rendered.131 Even third or fourth string personnel on a
college football team or a 12th man on a Division I
Men’s Basketball team must still attend all practices,
abide by team rules, undertake the required and
“voluntary” strength and conditioning, and perform
all activities identical to their grant-in-aid superstar
counterparts. Further, the NCAA makes it clear
that no third parties receive grants-in-aid without
having to participate in the athletic program as a
condition in order to continue being granted the
“scholarship” for their athletic services.132
Finally, comparing the athletic scholarship
with the merit-based or need-based scholarship
awarded to a non-athlete undergraduate or a graduate assistant also shows that the former is compensation.133 Athletic scholarships are granted only if
competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his
or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form
in that sport.” NCAA DIV. I MANUAL Bylaw art. 12.1.2 (2013),
available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf.
And under NCAA bylaws, the grant-in-aid is not considered
“pay” and thus is permitted. See id. Bylaw art. 12.01.4 (2013).
131 Id. Bylaw art. 12.01.1.
132 Id. Bylaw art. 15.01.2.
133 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 155.
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the athlete provides athletic services while meritbased or need-based scholarships awarded to nonathletes require no such reciprocity.134 Merit-based
and need-based scholarships are given to enable students to attend universities, but the universities
have the option to discontinue scholarships if the
student-athletes do not compete for them.135
C. The Predominantly Economic Relationship
Between Grant-in-Aid Student-Athletes and
Their Colleges
Applying the NLRB’s test in Brown to grantin-aid Big-Time College Football and Division I
Men’s Basketball student-athletes shows that they
are not average students and their relationship with
their universities is an economic one. 136 In order to
show that a university-athlete relationship is predominantly economic in nature, the standard in the
past was to demonstrate that the relationship was

Id.
Id.
136 Academic ability is independent of athletic talent.
Consequently, a university program that screens admissions
applications based upon potential academic success necessarily
excludes many talented athletes, leaving a team on the playing
field with diminished athletic potential. As former NCAA
Executive Director Byers remembered:
The big timers--building a national entertainment business--wanted the great players on
the field, whether or not they met customary
academic requirements. In the new open-door
era, [in which virtually all high school seniors
were academically “eligible” for college athletics
because of the wholesale abrogation of academic
entrance requirements,] victory-minded coaches
sensed a potential recruiting paradise.
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5 at 136.
134
135
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not primarily academic.137 “The NCAA academic
standards are designed to serve the employers’
enormous commercial interests, enabling universities
to recruit and retain gifted athletes rather than to
promote true academic achievement.”138 These “student-athletes” are not primarily students.139 The
majority of these individuals are inadequately prepared to handle the academics at their respective
universities and thus unable to adequately further
their education.140 The NCAA denotes these individuals as student-athletes in order to disguise their legal status of employees in the commercial college
sports entertainment industry.141
The Board in Brown decided that the relationship between graduate assistants is primarily an academic one as opposed to an economic one.142 If the
relationship was found to be for a university’s commercial benefit, then the decision may have gone the
other way. The Board refused to “assert jurisdiction
over relationships that are primarily educational.”143
1. Johnny Manziel’s Right of Publicity: The
Misappropriation of His Likeness for the
Commercial Benefit of Texas A&M University
If an NCAA student-athlete uses his or her
likeness for his or her own commercial benefit, it
may result in that athlete’s ineligibility. When this
same student-athlete makes his debut onto the camId. at 135.
Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 157 (citing interviews with various college athletes
about the secondary emphasis placed on academics).
141 Id. at 135.
142 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 489 (2004).
143 See id.
137
138
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pus field or court and performs at a high level, the
NCAA and the athlete’s school recognize that they
can reap commercial benefits from the athlete’s performance, which is actually exploiting the studentathlete.144 This poses a legal question for the NCAA
and its relationship with the current student-athlete.
Exploiting the student-athlete for a commercial benefit actually undermines the NCAA’s amateurism
dogma.
Texas A&M Quarterback Johnny Manziel and
his family recognized the intent of the NCAA and began to take steps to trademark his coveted name,
“Johnny Football.”145
A trademark is “a word,
phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of others. . . . In effect, a trademark
is the commercial substitute for one’s signature.” 146
Texas A&M University did not hesitate to try and
reap the commercial benefit from Manziel’s star status. “Texas A&M is working in concert with the
Manziel family to trademark the nickname,” said
Shan Hinckley, who is an Assistant Vice President of
Business Development at the school and runs the
Texas A&M University Aggies’ licensing program.147
The news was reported to the NCAA less than
two weeks after the investment organization filed for
144 Joye Pruitt, NCAA: Why Student-Athletes Should Be Paid
for Achievements in College, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 21, 2011),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/650687-ncaa-why-studentathletes-should-be-paid-for-achievements-incollege?comment_id=4313772.
145 Darren Rovell, A&M, Family Covet ‘Johnny Football’,
ESPN (Nov. 11, 2012), http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/8619087/johnny-manziel-family-trademarkjohnny-football.
146 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (9th ed. 2009).
147 Rovell, supra note 145.
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the “Johnny Football” trademark.148 The lawyer who
filed the trademark did not comment after the investigation but a university official confirmed the lawyer
was not working with Texas A&M University or the
Manziel family.149 The NCAA made it known that in
order for Johnny Manziel to keep his eligibility, neither Texas A&M nor his family could sell products
that in any way hint of a connection to the Texas
A&M quarterback Johnny Manziel.150 Also, the
NCAA notified Texas A&M to ensure that the school
prohibits vendors from selling products hinting to the
moniker “Johnny Football.”151
The Manziel family may have to wait two
more years to attempt to own the trademark “Johnny
Football” for licensing and merchandising deals,
since Manziel just finished his freshman football
season.152 NCAA regulations require that a Division
I football player remain in school for at least three
years. In order for Manziel to maintain his athletic
eligibility at Texas A&M the NCAA asserted that
neither the university or Manziel and his family can
sell products that connect ‘Johnny Football’ to
Id.
Id.
150 Id.
151 Kenny Ryan, While NCAA Rules Prohibit Manziel from
Profiting from His Own Success, It Can’t Stop Others, Daily
Times (Dec. 15, 2012),
http://dailytimes.com/manziel/article_d469e192-4691-11e28554-0019bb2963f4.html.
152 See generally Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast
Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047 (1999). A party can rebut the
presumption that a registered trademark is valid and that
registrant is entitled to exclusive use of mark by showing that
the party used the mark in commerce first, since a fundamental
tenet of trademark law is that ownership of an inherently
distinctive mark is governed by priority of use.
148
149
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Manziel himself.153 Moreover, the NCAA put Texas
A&M on notice that they must take reasonable
affirmative steps to stop vendors from doing the
same.154 Once the NCAA told the school to enforce
this policy against vendors, Texas A&M took
appropriate steps in October and November 2012. 155
However, Manziel’s number 2 jersey was available at
the school’s bookstore on Friday, November 9, 2012.
The bookstore completely sold out his jersey over
that weekend and another shipment of his number 2
jersey arrived on Monday November 12, 2012. 156
From that point on it was a revolving door of number
2 Texas A&M football jerseys being shipped to the
store and purchased by consumers. Before that, the
only two Texas A&M football jerseys on the shelves
in the Texas A&M bookstore that were available for
purchase bore the numbers 1 and 12.157 There was
never a Texas A&M football jersey with the number
2 on it in the bookstore available for purchase before
Manziel’s jersey.158
Since Manziel’s name, image or the moniker
“Johnny Football” was not placed anywhere on the
Texas A&M football jersey that had the number 2 on
it, the NCAA and Texas A&M University would argue that they are in no way exploiting Manziel’s
likeness. The school would say that it never attached
153 Joseph Jacobsen, Google and Stanford Help Texas A&M
Save Its Football Season, Capture the “Johnny Football” Asset,
and Begin to Realign Student-Athlete Rights, 22 TEX. ENT. &
SPORTS L.J. 7 (2013), available at http://teslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/TESLAW-Journal-Fall2013.pdf.
154 See id.
155 Ryan, supra note 151.
156 Telephone interview with a Texas A&M Merchandise
Representative (Oct. 15, 2012).
157 Id.
158 Id.
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Johnny Manziel’s name, image, or likeness to the
sold commercial merchandise and thus never exploited him for the school’s financial gain.
However, once a person is well-known entity
and a drawing card for revenue generating public
consumption, a person’s likeness is not limited to
name, moniker, and image. A person’s likeness can
also be an identifiable mark or trait of a person. This
is evident in the California Court of Appeal case,
Motshenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.159
In Motshenbacher, Lothar Motshenbacher was
a Formula I race driver who had his car painted in
esoteric color designs so that they would stand apart
from the other cars.160 R. J. Reynolds created a
commercial with cars on the track and the plaintiff’s
car in the foreground. The plaintiff’s image was
scrambled so he could not be identified and some of
the car’s characteristics were changed. 161 The car’s
number was changed from 11 to 71, and a wing
spoiler was added to the back of the car.162 The red
color and the white pinstripes remained, however,
giving the illusion that Motshenbacher was driving
the car.163 The initial decision of the trial court
found in favor of the defendant, with the court finding that (1) the person driving the car was unrecognizable and therefore unidentifiable, and (2) a reasonable inference could not be drawn that the driver
was Motschenbacher, or any other driver. 164 But the
California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s
159 Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821, 824 (1974).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 822.
164 Id. at 822.
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decision and stated that the fact that the likeness of
the driver (alleged to be Motschenbacher) was unrecognizable in the commercial, the number of the racing car had been changed from 11 to 71 and the fact
that car now had an added spoiler did not preclude a
finding that the driver was identifiable as Motschenbacher in view of the distinctive decorations on the
car. The California Court of Appeal for those reasons
held that the use of the car was a misappropriation
of an identifiable attribute of Motschenbacher, thus
violating his right of publicity.165
Applying the California Court of Appeal’s reasoning to the Texas A&M number 2 football jersey,
when a Texas A&M student, alumni member, or general college football fan walks into the Texas A&M
bookstore, a more than reasonable inference will be
drawn that the player who wears that Texas A&M
number 2 football jersey on Saturdays is Johnny
Manziel. First, it is the Texas A&M Football Team
jersey and second, the number 2 is on the jersey and
the inference can be made that the jersey is that of
Johnny Manziel. In view of the distinctive commercial object, the number 2 Texas A&M Football jersey
is identifiable by the majority of the public as Johnny
Manziel’s jersey. For these reasons, the NCAA and
Texas A&M’s use of the number 2 Texas A&M football jersey on it is a misappropriation of an identifiable attribute of Johnny Manziel for the sole advantages of the NCAA and Texas A&M University
advantage, thus violating Manziel’s right of publicity.
Additionally, Texas A&M knows that it can
make money indirectly from Johnny Manziel by selling jerseys, T-shirts and hats with the signature
165

Id. at 827.
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number 2 placed on them, but they’re not permitted
to use Manziel’s name, likeness or “Johnny Football”
moniker.166 That did not stop Texas A&M from doing what they are allowed to do within the NCAA
rules.167 Over the course of the 2012-2013 college
football season, 2,500 Texas A&M Replica Football
jerseys and 1,400 t-shirts with the number 2 were
sold at the Texas A&M campus store.168 Another
shipment of T-shirts was made to the Texas A&M
campus store sometime in early December after the
T-shirts sold out.169
Footballs and helmets signed by Manziel,
(or at least advertised as signed by him, as Texas
A&M University officials say many of the items
are fake), have sold for more than $400. 170 One
seller on eBay who claims to be selling the original
“Johnny Football” shirt boasts in his listing that
he has sold 625 footballs and helmets. 171 Also
listed is a version of a pullover-hooded sweatshirt
with a new phrase growing in commercial popularity, “HEISMANZIEL.” 172 Other items listed for
commercial consumption were bumper stickers,
trading cards, custom figurines, iPhone cases, and
mugs.173
Scenarios like the one with Johnny Manziel
have been an ongoing commercial benefit for the
166 Darren Rovell, Will Johnny Manziel Ever Cash In?, ESPN
(Dec. 7, 2012, 10:47 AM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/2547/willjohnny-manziel-ever-cash-in.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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NCAA member schools for several years. It would be
unreasonable to think that the University of Florida
did not make a small fortune by selling University of
Florida football jerseys with the number 15 when
Tim Tebow was the quarterback for the Gators. It is
also reasonable to believe that the University of Texas increased its revenue by selling the University of
Texas football jerseys with the number 10 the year
Vince Young was playing quarterback for the Longhorns. However, there will be much larger revenues
generated for Texas A&M University with respect to
sales of the football jerseys with the number #2 over
the next two years. Texas A&M’s Vice President
John Cook said, “Frankly, we’re not doing anything
that hasn’t been done before. The difference is he’s
[Quarterback Johnny Manziel] a freshman.”174 It is
an important difference. Johnny Manziel flourished
as a star quarterback as a true freshman. Under the
NCAA bylaws, Manziel will be forced to play at the
Division I College Football level for at least two more
years before becoming eligible to enter the National
Football League draft. 175
In all likelihood Johnny Manziel will play his
second and third year of Division I college football
eligibility as quarterback for the Texas A&M Aggies
and the money at the campus bookstore will continue
to flow in. The average price of a replica football jersey, whether college or professional, is between $60
and $70. Replica T-shirts sell for approximately $20
each.176 Furthermore, one can speculate that other
merchandise will be sold at Texas A&M given the
fact the school officials will surely think of innovative
Id.
Id.
176 Id.
174
175
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ways to try and disguise the inference of Manziel’s
name, image or likeness. It is more than reasonable
to infer and conclude that the revenue Texas A&M
University will generate from the sales of commercial
merchandise while Johnny Manziel is still playing
quarterback for the Aggies during the 2013-2014 and
2014-2015 college football seasons will be similar if
not greater than in the 2012-2013 season.
The amount of potential revenue that Manziel
will generate for the school is certainly substantial.
Yet it is simply incomprehensible that under the current NCAA bylaws, Manziel will not receive any
monetary compensation for any item sold bearing a
resemblance to him. Texas A&M will certainly cash
in big if it continues to sell commercial merchandise
carrying the number 2, and continuing to misappropriate Johnny’s Manziel’s likeness for its own commercial benefit.
NCAA President Mark Emmert feels that it is
a non-issue that Manziel can market his image and
likeness while enrolled at an NCAA member school.
Although an athlete like Manziel can generate future
profits for himself through his image and likeness, it
does not mean he should be able to do so while enrolled at Texas A&M. He further contends that one
of the reasons it is hard to figure an appropriate
monetary compensation for Manziel is because it is
not known how much Manziel himself helped to sell
any item, whether a Football Jersey, T-shirt, football,
Texas A&M helmet, etc. President Emmert said,
The position of the NCAA has always been
that when a student is playing for their
university, they are getting the full advantage of being part of that university.
They are able to build on that popularity,
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and when they go pro, they are extraordinarily well-positioned to monetize their
brand. And why will Johnny Manziel be
able to do that? Because he played at Texas
A&M and was successful and perhaps won
the Heisman.177

President Emmert further contends, “It’s not
just that it’s a No. 2 [jersey], . . . [i]t’s a Texas A&M
No. 2. I can’t parse out the value of the number on
one side and the university on the other. They go together.”178
However, this statement does not focus on the
reality of why there would be such substantial sales
of Texas A&M number 2 jerseys and T-shirts. The
reason is that the number 2 is a recognizable attribute as Johnny Manziel’s Texas A&M football jersey
number. It is a difficult inference to make that the
success Johnny Manziel experienced as freshman college football quarterback would automatically lead
him to the National Football League, enabling him to
reap the benefits of his brand “Johnny Football.”179
What if Manziel suffers a career ending injury while
in college or suffers an injury that will weaken his
playing ability as a quarterback for the remainder of
his career?
Emmert, in his assertion, is guaranteeing that
Manziel will have a successful professional career in
the National Football League, or other professional
football league, after his time at Texas A&M. This is
a risky assumption to make in a violent game like
football where injuries occur often and unexpectedly.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
179 Id.
177
178
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D. NCAA Proposal 26: An Attempt to Further
Disguise the NCAA “Money Machine” by
Exploiting Student-Athletes’ Likenesses
Technological advancements, such as the improvement of video game graphics, have forced the
NCAA to change its rules that govern corporate
sponsorship attaching themselves to studentathletes. For example, the NCAA’s current rules allow a corporate sponsor, such as NIKE, to attach its
brand name to current student-athletes, where those
same athletes appear at NCAA sanctioned events.
Moreover, the current rules allow corporate sponsors
to attach themselves to student-athletes and advertise their brand, as long as it is contemporaneous
with “promoting NCAA athletic competitions or other
NCAA sanctioned events.”180
The NCAA is continuously testing the waters
in this respect. In March 2011, the NCAA Cabinet
sponsored possible amendments to its likeness proposal.181 The Cabinet, in an article posted on the
NCAA website, stated,
Prop[osal] No. 2010-26, aims to accommodate advancements in technology and facilitate more authentic promotions associating
schools with their sponsors while maintaining the Association’s fundamental principles that prohibit commercial exploitation
of student-athletes.182

The proposal that follows the principles developed by the 2008 Presidential Task Force on ComCabinet Sponsors Possible Amendments to Likeness
Proposal, supra note 82.
181 Id.
182 Id.
180
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mercial Activity in Division I Athletics continues
many of the safeguards contained within the current
legislation, which allows the use of student-athlete’s
name or likeness for “promotions, advertisements
and media activities if specific conditions are met.” 183
“Among current conditions carried over into the new
legislation” of Proposal No. 2010-26 are: (1) studentathlete permission and (2) athletic director approval
for each activity. Additionally the new proposal
takes those two core requirements and adds a refinement:
Promotional activity by a sponsor of an institution, conference or the NCAA must
clearly identify the commercial entity’s
sponsor affiliation (for example, an official
sponsor of the institution or event) when
student-athlete images are shown.184

The two current conditions in Proposal 201026 are tainted and represent legal issues for the
NCAA. In regard to a student-athlete’s permission
to use their likeness for the NCAA’s purported commercial purposes, the NCAA would be able to do this
even if they never approached the athlete for consent
to use his image for the association’s own commercial
purposes.185 Technically, the student-athlete had already consented to this by signing the NCAA’s Student-Athlete Form 08-3a found in the NCAA Division
1 National Letter of Intent.
1. Student-Athlete Permission
As previously mentioned, before the studentId.
Id.
185 Id.
183
184
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athlete is allowed to participate in practice he or she
must sign various sections of Student-Athlete Statement Form 08-3a, which contains the language referring to the use of their images and likeness to promote NCAA championships, activities, events, or
other programs. The wording is vague and ambiguous. This could present a legal dilemma for the
NCAA. As mentioned earlier, the student-athletes
must sign Form 08-3a in order to participate in team
practices and games, NCAA athletic competitions,
among other NCAA member institutions.
These student-athletes are essentially left
with no reasonable alternative but to sign Form 083a. It is unreasonable to argue that a studentathlete would refuse to sign Form 08-3a, and thus
voluntarily pass up their NCAA athletic eligibility
because of their preference for the NCAA not to use
their name, image, or likeness to further promote the
association.
2. Athletic Director Approval
Proposal 26 arose from a debate. Some NCAA
athletic directors supported the idea of attaching a
brand, such as NIKE, to a current student-athlete.
Some athletic directors approved this because they
each recognize that attaching a corporate sponsor to
a current student-athlete’s name image or likeness
would create a new source of revenue to college
sports programs.186 Given the way the purported
amendments in Proposal 26 are drafted, athletic directors will now search for imaginative ways to gen186 Jerry Briggs, Caution Advised on NCAA Legislation Over
Likenesses: Potential Revenue Source Could Lead to
Controversy, MY SAN ANTONIO (Jan. 16, 2011).
http://www.mysanantonio.com/sports/article/Caution-advisedon-NCAA-legislation-over-959224.php.
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erate revenue for their athletic department by attaching brands to well-known student-athletes’
names, images, or likeness.187 University of Texas
San Antonio Athletic Director Lynn Hickey argued if
the NCAA wants to use the student-athletes’ images
and likeness for promotion it should be done in a way
to help them rather than exploit them.188 Athletic
Director Hickey then added,
It would be great to do something that
would give the kids more visibility or to give
more credit to the program,” Hickey said.
“But how are you going to determine if
you’re just not producing revenue for the
corporate group vs. the university’s interests?189

It is hard to say, but it is more likely than not
that the NCAA has created a new source of revenue
generation for itself and is exploiting the studentathletes for its own commercial benefit. Moreover,
some athletic directors of the NCAA’s member
schools already recognize student-athletes as a drawing card to the public, thus attaching a brand to wellknown student-athletes would create a huge revenue
stream.
Proposal 26 is aimed at avoiding the exploitation of current student athletes while broadening the
scope of what sponsors can do with promotions.
Aside from the already mentioned current rules in
the legislation, athletes would not endorse commercial products. The current proposal combines these
three core requirements of student-athlete permisId.
Id.
189 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
187
188
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sion, athletic director approval, and non-commercial
products and adds refinements, including: “A promotional activity by a sponsor of an institution, conference or NCAA must clearly identify entity’s sponsor
affiliation.”190 This raises issues and demonstrates
why these student-athletes should be compensated
for their revenue producing skills. Mike Rodgers, the
faculty athletics representative at Baylor University,
argued for this new refinement set forth in Docket
No. Proposal 2010-26 to the NCAA Division I Amateurism Cabinet.191
There have been several arguments for paying
student-athletes in the past. A common argument
that several officials have made is generally summarized as follows, “Why would we not pay these student-athletes?
They are the people that draw
111,000 paid spectators for Saturday football games
at the Big House (The University of Michigan Football Stadium). They are the people who sell out Cameron Indoor Field House for every Duke University
Home Basketball Game.”
But now the NCAA and some of its member
schools’ athletic directors want to attach corporate
sponsorships to these student-athletes’ names, images, and likeness to make more money, without giving
the athletes any portion of the revenue. It would be
difficult for the NCAA to argue that a decision to use
these student-athletes’ images or likenesses in any
way that it or its member schools saw fit, would center around the student-athlete’s welfare as opposed
to the exploitation of these athlete for their own
commercial benefit.
Id.
Cabinet Sponsors Possible Amendments to Likeness
Proposal, supra note 82.
190
191
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In the year 2014, it is a realistic fact that high
level student-athletes are a huge attraction to the
general public.192 There is no problem with the
NCAA and its member institutions attaching current
student-athletes to corporate sponsorships, but if this
is the NCAA’s projected future of how it will operate
its commercial enterprise, the NCAA must begin to
compensate these student-athletes, because failing to
do so would clearly be exploiting these athletes’
names, images, and likeness for its sole commercial
benefit.193
E. Recognition of the NCAA’s Manifest
Disregard and Exploitation of Student-Athletes
Big-Time College Football and Division I
Men’s Basketball have both transformed into revenue-generating machines.194 The college football
teams who participate in different Bowl Games receive a hefty payout. The majority of the money is
distributed equally to that conference’s member institutions in addition to a windfall for the teams
competing in the Bowl Games.195 Division I Men’s
Basketball fares relatively well as well, with the
NCAA licensing the rights to CBS and its member
channels for 14 years to exclusively broadcast the
March Madness tournament for $10.8 billion.196
These statistics, along with the financial aid
these student-athletes get specifically to compete in
Briggs, supra note 186.
Id.
194 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
195 Jon Solomon, Profit from BCS National Championship
Game Won’t Be a Big Windfall, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, (Jan. 5,
2010 at 9:01 PM), http://blog.al.com/birmingham-newsstories/2010/01/profit_from_bcs_national_champ.html.
196 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
192
193
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NCAA competitions, shows that they are getting
compensated for their athletic services rendered to
their universities. It has been demonstrated, but not
held to date by the NLRB or the judiciary, that the
Big-Time College Football and Division I studentathlete-university relationship is predominantly an
economic and not an educational one.197 Therefore,
they should be considered employees under the
NLRB legal standards. Additionally, both former and
current Big-Time College Football and Division I
Men’s Basketball student-athletes have acknowledged that the NCAA has turned into a “money making machine” for its own commercial benefit. 198
The lawsuit filed by former University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) Men’s Basketball player
Ed O’Bannon,199 demonstrates that former studentathletes recognize that the NCAA misappropriates
their likenesses for its own commercial benefit, and
fails to compensate these once NCAA studentathletes even though these athletes are no longer enrolled in college. Several former Big-Time College
Football and Division I Men’s Basketball players attempted to join O’Bannon’s lawsuit in a consolidated
class action Complaint filed in July 2013.200 The
players received a class action certification for the
lawsuit against the NCAA, and the lawsuit is set for
trial in early 2014.
Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
See John J. Leppler, Is the Unauthorized Use of Former
Collegiate Student-Athletes’ “Likeness” a Violation of Their
Right of Publicity? 26-27 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
available at http://works.bepress.com/john_leppler/1/.
199 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09-1967
CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
200 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Licensing Litig., No.
C 09-019667 CW, 2013 WL 3810438 (N.D.Cal. July 19, 2013)
197
198
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1. O’Bannon v. NCAA and Student-Athlete
Statement Division I Form 08-3a Section IV
O’Bannon, barring a settlement, will most
likely be tried in 2014201 and may ultimately foreclose that the relationship between these studentathletes and their universities is purely an economic
one, and therefore student-athletes should be compensated for their athletic services rendered to their
universities.
Ed O’Bannon, a former college basketball
player for UCLA, filed the aforementioned class action lawsuit in July 2009 against the NCAA, CLC,
and EA claiming that the defendants were conspiring
to use former collegiate players’ images and likenesses for commercial benefit in perpetuity, because the
former players had relinquished their personal attribute rights by signing the Student-Athlete Statement Division I Form 08-3a Section IV.202 EA sought
a dismissal, arguing that the company was simply
following the rules laid down by the NCAA: former
athletes’ rights were relinquished and they did not
have to be compensated for the use of their images or
likenesses.203 Judge Claudia Wilken of the US District Court of Northern California agreed with EA,
Inc. and granted the company a dismissal in May
2011.204 In doing so, Judge Wilken stated:
201 Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint:
Paying College Athletes, SPORT J. (June 15, 2012, 9:48 AM),
http://thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-payingcollege-athletes.
202 O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *2; see Leppler, supra note
198 at 23.
203 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No.
CV-09-1967-CW, 2013 WL 5402512 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013).
204 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No.
C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
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This purported conspiracy involves ‘Defendants’ concerted action to require all
current student-athletes to sign forms each
year that purport to require each of them to
relinquish all rights in perpetuity for the
use of their images, likeness and/or names’
and to deny any compensation ‘through restrictions in the [NCAA] Bylaws.’ The Consolidated Amended Complaint, however,
does not contain any allegations to suggest
that EA agreed to participate in this conspiracy.205

But Judge Wilken left the door open for the
plaintiff to introduce evidence that would show that
EA was involved with a conspiracy to use the former
athletes for commercial benefit without compensation.206 O’Bannon’s attorney Jon King later argued
that the rules that apply to current student-athletes
should not govern former student-athletes in relation
to compensation if their images or likenesses are
used for commercial benefit, and that EA conspired
with the NCAA and CLC not to pay them. 207
If the plaintiffs win O’Bannon, the decision
will not only forever affect the way the NCAA conducts its commercial business but may also prove the
relationship between these particular studentathletes and their universities is predominantly an
economic one, leading to the conclusion that the student-athletes should be compensated by more than
just a financial aid package.
Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No.
C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
207 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No.
C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
205
206
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2. What the Future May Hold for the NCAA as
a Result of the Forthcoming
O’Bannon Decision
Regardless of whether the Manziel family
eventually receives the “Johnny Football” football
trademark, the Manziel family recognizes the
NCAA’s restriction of student-athletes to license
their likenesses, so that the NCAA is the only entity
currently allowed to use each student-athlete’s likeness for its own commercial benefit. This demonstrates the economic nature of this relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA.
One further point with respect to the
O’Bannon case, U.S. District Court Judge Alfred
Covello has ordered ESPN to provide Ed O’Bannon
and his attorneys with its television and licensing
contracts for Division I Men’s Basketball and Football since 2005.208 The order sets the table for
O’Bannon to gain a much better understanding of
how much the NCAA profits from current and former
players’ names, images and likenesses.209 The order
also highlights how the O’Bannon case threatens not
only the NCAA and its member institutions, but also
companies that have profited from Division I Men’s
Basketball and football through contracts with the
NCAA and members.210 Judge Covello’s ruling is a
208 Michael McCann, Judge Orders ESPN to Turn Over
Contracts in Ed O’Bannon Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2,
2012, 4:26 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/
michael_mccann/10/02/Ed-O-Bannon-ESPN/index.html.
209 Id.
210 Id.
O’Bannon claims that, among other things,
Form 08-3a and Article 12.5.1.1 enable NCAA to
enter into licensing agreements with companies
that distribute products containing student athletes’ images . . . and [the athletes] do not re-
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reminder that the O’Bannon case presents real financial and legal risk for the NCAA, CLC or any of
the NCAA’s member institutions.211
The information that ESPN was enjoined to
disclose by Judge Covello, which ESPN considered
privileged, is nowhere near the biggest worry.212 Regardless of whether the plaintiffs win, the NCAA,
CLC, EA, and any other entity (including ESPN) will
be forced to surrender its own private knowledge of
just how much it has profited from the labor of Big
Time College Football and Division I Men’s Basketball student-athletes.213 If the plaintiffs in fact win
in 2014, it follows that the court will hold that the
NCAA wrongly profited from the names, images, and
likenesses of the student-athletes.214 If the NCAA
did this knowingly, then the companies connected

ceive compensation for the use of their images.
O’Bannon Compl. ¶ 80. O’Bannon asserts that
NCAA’s and CLC’s actions excluded him and
other former student athletes from the collegiate licensing market. He claims that, because
NCAA has rights to images of him from his collegiate career, it, along with its co-conspirators,
fix the price for the use of his image at ‘zero.’
O’Bannon Compl. ¶ 86. He maintains that this
conduct ‘has artificially limited supply and depressed prices paid by Defendants and their coconspirators to Plaintiff and the members of the
Class for use of their images after cessation of
participation
in
intercollegiate
sports.’
O’Bannon Compl. ¶ 182.
O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *3.
211 McCann, supra note 208.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.; see also O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010).
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with the NCAA have arguably done the same. 215
Regardless of the outcome of O’Bannon, it is
no longer a secret as to how much the NCAA benefits
from these particular student-athletes.216 If the
plaintiffs lose, it is only a matter of time as to when
the judiciary and the NLRB will come to conclude
that the relationship between the schools and their
grant-in-aid Big-Time College Football and Division I
Men’s Basketball student-athletes is predominantly
an economic one, and therefore student-athletes
should be compensated by the school for their services rendered.
A. Possible Methods of Compensation for
Student-Athletes
The cornerstone of the NCAA’s argument is
that it wants to instill the notion of amateurism in
college athletics.217 Since the beginning of college
athletics, student-athletes have played for pride and
for the love of the game, without being compensated
for their performance on the fields and courts. However, the time has come for the NCAA to shy away
from this ancient hallmark, and begin to pay players.
Wallace Renfro, an NCAA Senior Policy analyst,
commented on the NCAA’s economic model that redistributes money from revenue generating sports to
other parts of the athletic department at a university.218 Renfro drafted a memo to NCAA President,
Mark Emmert, noting that the term student-athlete
McCann, supra note 208.
Id.
217 Pruitt, supra note 144.
218 Tom Farrey,‘Student-Athlete’ Term in Question, ESPN
(Sept. 19, 2012, 8:31 PM),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8396753/ncaa-policy-chiefproposes-dropping-student-athlete-term.
215
216
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is one that “Walter Byers created to counter the criticism that we are paying college athletes when we began providing grants-in-aid.”219 Walter Byers, the
first executive director of the NCAA, coined the
phrase grant-in-aid, and the term has been used ever
since to describe an athletic scholarship. 220
Renfro wrote the memo to Emmert in response
to the O’Bannon suit’s claim that the NCAA violates
antitrust laws by preventing universities from allowing athletes to be compensated beyond the monetary
amount of a grant-in-aid. An important quote from
the memo, which Emmert has not yet responded to,
is as follows:
We have always had a cradle-to-grave approach to amateurism,’ Renfro wrote. ‘You
are born an amateur, but like innocence
once lost, it cannot be regained. But our
commitment to amateurism has often been
based on something other than how we define amateurism in our own constitution. In
the most romantic sense we think of amateurism as playing sports for the love of the
game, for the camaraderie among competitors, for the pride of victory for school or
colors, and then we use this romanticized
sense of amateurism to define the entire enterprise of collegiate athletics.221

This quote alone speaks volumes. The NCAA
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
221 Id. (internal quotes omitted); see Eamonn Brennan, First
Wave of NCAA Documents Arrive, ESPN (Sept. 19, 2012, 1:05
PM),
http://m.espn.go.com/general/blogs/blogpost?blogname=collegeb
asketballnation&id=64203&wjb=.
219
220
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understands that the amateurism veil is pierced, and
the NCAA must move forward and leave behind the
antiquated notion that the student-athlete only receives the grant-in-aid money, when evidence clearly
shows that the student-athletes deserve more or at
least “a cut of the pie” from the revenue they generate for the NCAA from their services rendered.222
However, there are ways to compensate the
student-athletes and at the same time promote the
amateurism of college athletics, even if the studentathlete and NCAA relationship is predominantly an
economic one.223 There are three different possibilities.
First, the NCAA should set up an escrow account for each student-athlete, where money earned
from NCAA licensing and merchandising deals with
respect to each player will be deposited.224 Having
this type escrow account for each student-athlete
would be more effective than the potential of having
the NLRB regulate the distribution of the licensing
and merchandising revenue. The marketplace will
determine what each student-athlete earns – the
same scheme used in professional sports leagues.225
Second, the NCAA could pay players based on
their merit and performance in games. In this scenario, the financial situation would not be determined by the celebrity status of the studentathlete.226 From a performance standpoint, compen222 Steve Haywood, Top College Athletes Deserve a Piece of the
Pie. ONMILWAUKEE.COM (May 14, 2008, 6:53 PM),
http://onmilwaukee.com/myOMC/authors/stevehaywood/haywoo
dblog051408.html.
223 Farrey, supra note 218.
224 Pruitt, supra note 144.
225 Id.
226 Id.
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sating student-athletes for their athletic performances would lead to a stronger work ethic. This in turn
would motivate both the superstar just out of high
school, and the third or fourth stringer to work harder to obtain loftier goals. 227 This would ultimately
provide a better showcase of the student-athletes’
talents and provide a greater financial contribution
to their team and their university.228
With respect to the “merit” stipulation, if the
NCAA were to compensate athletes based on a certain grade point averages, greater academic excellence would be encouraged.229 Most NCAA member
institutions reward athletes for their athletic standing and fail miserably when overseeing and evaluating h student-athlete performance in the classroom.230 If the NCAA truly feels that the relationship between it and the student-athlete is predominantly an educational one, and would not want the
NLRB to get involved, then it would be best at this
stage to pay the student-athlete and also provide the
student-athlete with incentive to work hard to perform well in academics.
CONCLUSION
Grant-in-aid student-athletes that compete in
the two revenue-generating sports, Big-Time College
Football and NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball are
not student-athletes as the NCAA asserts, but are
employees under the NLRA.231 Student-athletes
meet both the common law test and the statutory
test applicable to university students, and they
Id.
Id.
229 Pruitt, supra note 144.
230 Id.
231 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 92.
227
228
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should be compensated for their athletic services
rendered to the university.232
The NCAA refers to these athletes as “studentathletes” which leads to significant legal implications.233 The term signifies that student-athletes are
amateurs who should not expect any form of reward
after participating in NCAA collegiate sports. However, the reality is these students are employees under the NLRA because they meet the common law
“right of control” test and the NLRA’s statutory employee standard.234 From an economic standpoint,
Big-Time College Football and Division I Men’s Basketball both generate millions of dollars each year.235
The NCAA provides the media with programming material for advertising and directly retains all
profits, yet it insists that the persons generating the
revenue are amateurs.236 Moreover, the revenues
generated benefit only the NCAA and its member institutions. The NCAA’s decision to repeatedly deny
student-athletes payment from a legal and economic
standpoint is no longer justifiable. Grant-in-aid BigTime College Football and Division I Men’s Basketball student-athletes should not be referred to as
amateurs because the NCAA has commercialized the
industry and has led to the exploitation of those student-athletes for its own commercial benefit.237
“Once the innocence is lost, it can never be regained.”238 It is no longer a secret that the NCAA
cannot claim its affirmative defense of amateurId.
Id. at 86.
234 Id.
235 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
236 Id.
237 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5.
238 Farrey, supra note 218.
232
233
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ism.239 The NCAA should accept that these particular student-athletes are the moneymakers for its lucrative commercial enterprise, and should develop a
payment method for fair compensation, above the
grant-in-aid, for their services rendered and the revenue produced for their school, the NCAA, and its
member institutions.

239

Id.

133

